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Executive Summary 
background 
While the number of institutions, policies, and programs charged with stewardship 
of the global commons has risen dramatically over the last thirty years, the state of 
the global environment continues to show negative trends and increasing risks. In 
response, governments, civil society leaders, and policy experts have called for 
stronger governance of the global commons by transforming the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) into a more powerful global environmental 
organization. Any reform initiative should begin, however, with a review of the 
existing global environmental regime. This report assesses UNEP’s performance in 
the context of international environmental governance with regard to three core 
functions: 1) monitoring, assessment, and reporting on the state of the global 
environment; 2) setting an agenda for action and managing the process of 
establishing standards, policies, and guidelines; and 3) developing institutional 
capacity to address existing and emerging problems. 
findings 
UNEP has a clear mandate to serve as the leading or “anchor” institution for the 
global environment, but has done so with only partial success. It has been relatively 
effective in two key areas – (1) monitoring and assessment and (2) launching 
environmental agreements. It has also served as the main policy forum for 
environment ministries from around the world and helped build their institutional 
capacity. However, UNEP has fallen short in managing policy processes in a coherent 
and coordinated fashion, has failed to provide an ability to benchmark performance 
and identify “best practices,” and has not established itself as the institutional home 
for the numerous international environmental conventions. Without a center of 
gravity, the system of international environmental governance has grown 
increasingly complex and fragmented. 
At the core of this dynamic lies a key set of structural shortcomings. Contrary to 
conventional wisdom, UNEP was not constructed to be a weak and ineffective institu­
tion, but rather was expected to grow into its mandate as it proved its effectiveness. 
Four structural features instituted with the best intentions at the time of UNEP’s 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
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creation have instead inhibited its performance and growth. First, UNEP’s authority has 
been severely constrained by its status within the UN system as a Programme rather 
than a Specialized Agency. Second, because of UNEP’s governance structure, more 
attention has been paid to the needs and demands of member states than to the overall 
mission of the organization. Third, UNEP’s financial structure has enabled countries to 
pursue their own agendas by using UNEP to advance their pet issues, rather than 
financing activities for the common good. Fourth, UNEP’s physical distance from the 
centers of political activity has negatively affected its capacity to coordinate numerous 
environment-related agencies as well as, most importantly, its ability to attract top-tier 
policy staff. As a consequence of its many structural limitations, UNEP has been unable 
to articulate a long-term institutional vision to guide its strategy. 
recommendations 
UNEP’s role as a strong global voice and conscience for the environment has remained 
largely unfulfilled. UNEP, however, offers a potentially strong comparative advantage 
in environmental monitoring, assessment, and information-sharing and is the natural 
forum for the creation of a coherent international system in this area. UNEP could also 
lay the foundation for a policy forum that convenes various clusters of agencies and 
networks to negotiate and exchange experience. Its leadership position within the 
Environmental Management Group could grant it the policy space for such an 
initiative. UNEP has undertaken many projects to support national environmental 
efforts and has developed an understanding of key needs around the world. A more 
strategic, prioritized, and long-term capacity development approach could facilitate 
implementation of major agreements by drawing on UNEP’s work as an information 
clearinghouse and a policy forum, rather than as an operational agency. 
This report offers recommendations to the United Nations Secretary-General, 
national governments, UNEP, and international organizations and civil society 
responsible for the stewardship of the global environment, summarized below. 
recommendations 
United Nations Secretary-General 
●	 Launch a comprehensive assessment of the global environmental gover­
nance system 
Governments UNEP 
●● Initiate an independent Create a global environmental 
strategic review information clearinghouse within 
UNEP 
● Consolidate financial 
● accounting and reporting Create a global environmental 
capacity clearinghouse 
● Restructure organizational 
governance ●	 Cluster institutions 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
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the recommendations in more detail 
1.	 Initiate an assessment of global environmental governance to clarify the mandates 
of the numerous existing organizations, elaborate a substantive vision, identify pri­
ority issues to be addressed, and outline ways for implementation. Such an assess­
ment could provide a replicable template for similar evaluations of lead institutions 
in other global public goods domains and lay a solid foundation for UN reform. 
2.	 Create an information clearinghouse to provide a comprehensive and consoli­
dated information source with comparable data on environmental issues, trends, 
policy results, and risks around the globe. The clearinghouse could build on 
UNEP’s comparative advantage in environmental monitoring, assessment, and 
information exchange. 
3.	 Create a capacity clearinghouse to track and plan technical assistance activities, 
match the “supply” and “demand” of services, and highlight best practices on a wide 
range of projects. This institutional mechanism should be established drawing on 
the comparative strengths of both operational (UNDP and the World Bank) and 
normative (UNEP) agencies, as well as on the expertise and resources of the GEF. 
4.	 Cluster institutions to combine efforts of agencies on individual issues according 
to their comparative advantage. One approach would entail a different agency 
taking the lead in a certain issue area, leading to the formation of clusters around 
biodiversity, climate change, fisheries, desertification, and other existing and 
emerging issues. The Environmental Management Group – the interagency 
coordination mechanism for the United Nations created in 1999 – could be 
transformed into a useful platform for the coordination of such efforts. 
5.	 Initiate a strategic review of UNEP to compare actual performance to expected 
results, verify key constraints and opportunities, and identify ways to measure 
impact. An independent review would help collate reports on the status of 
reform efforts, prioritize short- and long-term goals, and establish time frames to 
complete reforms. 
6.	 Consolidate financial accounting and reporting within UNEP to classify expendi­
tures in terms of mandated functions or by environmental issue. Through more 
coherent financial reporting, UNEP could better build and maintain the confi­
dence of its donors. 
7.	 Restructure UNEP’s organizational governance to ensure effective prioritization 
of global environmental needs and effective internal management. An inclusive 
body like the Global Ministerial Environment Forum created in 1999 and com­
prising all environmental ministers from around the world (as opposed to the 
58-member UNEP Governing Council) and a smaller, more efficient Executive 
Board would better serve these two separate functions. A focus on strengthen­
ing the organization’s decisionmaking procedures – and adapting cutting-edge 
standards of “good governance” – would also build UNEP’s legitimacy and add 
to its authority. 




“It is the state of the environment that tells us whether our 
policies and programmes are effective.” 
Klaus Töpfer, Executive Director, UN Environment Programme1 1 Töpfer 2002. 
While the number of institutions, policies, and programs charged with stewardship 
of the global commons has risen dramatically over the last thirty years, the state of 
the global environment continues to show negative trends and increasing risks.2 As a 2 Speth 2004. 
result, national governments, civil society groups, and experts on global environment 
policy have called for strengthening the global environmental governance system3 3 Comprehensive reviews of 
global environmental gover­and, in turn, transforming the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
nance include: Desai 2004; 
into a more powerful global environmental organization. A recent proposal by the Esty and Ivanova 2002b; Kanie 
French and German governments to establish a UN Environment Organization and Haas 2004; Speth 2003, 
(UNEO), for example, has gained considerable attention and has emerged as a seri- 2004; Vogler and Imber 1996. 
ous political option for reforming the current system.4 
4 
See Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
– France 2005 and Tarasofsky 
and Hoare 2004. Institutional reform must ultimately be rooted in an understanding of 
where the global environmental governance system has succeeded, where 
it has failed, why that has been the case, and what the leverage points are 
to encourage better effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. The story of UNEP 
holds valuable lessons for any reform initiative. 
UNEP was established in 1972 in response to a common understanding that “the 
work in the field of environment needed a common outlook and direction”5 and that 5 Rydbeck 1972. 
it was necessary to create “a central co-coordinating mechanism in the United 
Nations to provide political and conceptual leadership, to contemplate methods of 
avoiding or reducing global environmental risks, of working out joint norms, and of 
avoiding or settling conflicts between states on environmental matters. Such a mech­
anism should be given enough authority and resources to ensure effective co-ordina­
tion of ongoing and planned activities.”6 6 Ibid. 
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7 
The anchor institution termi­
nology builds on a concept 
advanced by Alex Shakow 
(Shakow 2004). The definition 
of main functions also draws 
on the analysis of the out­
comes of the 1972 Stockholm 
Declaration in terms of key 
functions of the central inter­
national environment organi­
zation and on more recent 
works on this topic. See Head 
1978; Haas et al 1993; Esty and 
Ivanova 2002a. 
8 
For proposals for a World 
Environmental Organization 
(WEO), see Biermann 2000, 
2001, 2002a, 2002b; Biermann 
and Bauer 2004, 2005; 
Charnovitz 2002. For a Global 
Environment Organization 
(GEO) see Esty 1994, 2000; 
Runge 2001; Ruggiero 1998. 
For a Global Environmental 
Mechanism (GEM) see Esty 
and Ivanova 2002a. 
9 
Najam 2001. 
10 Imber 1993 cited in 
Najam2003. 
11 Conca 1995 cited in Najam 
2003. 
12 








von Moltke 1996. 
17 
United Nations 1997. 
UNEP was thus created as the core, or anchor institution, for the global environ­
ment to gather and transmit information, catalyze action, and coordinate environ­
mental activities within the UN system. Anchor institutions are the primary, though 
not the only, international organizations in a global issue area and typically perform 
three main functions:7 1) overseeing monitoring, assessment, and reporting on the 
state of the issue in their purview; 2) setting an agenda for action and managing the 
process of determining standards, policies, and guidelines; and 3) developing institu­
tional capacity to address existing and emerging problems. Anchor institutions define 
problems, develop new policy ideas and programs, manage crises, and set priorities 
for shared activities that would not exist otherwise. 
Contemporary reform initiatives for environmental governance fall into two cat­
egories: (1) those that take UNEP as a departure point for system-wide reform, such 
as the UNEO initiative proposing that UNEP be upgraded into a specialized agency 
and (2) those that advance a radical system overhaul, like the proposals for a WEO 
(World Environment Organization), GEO (Global Environmental Organization), 
and GEM (Global Environmental Mechanism).8 
While the institutional landscape for environmental governance is indeed 
cluttered and fragmented, it is imperative to begin any reform initiative 
with a sound overview of institutional accomplishments, challenges, and 
constraints. 
The objective of this report is to assess UNEP’s performance and to identify key fac­
tors that have shaped its performance over the past thirty years. Analysts of UNEP offer 
a wide range of opinions regarding the effectiveness of the organization, yet few of 
these statements are grounded in empirical evidence, as no systematic assessment of 
UNEP’s performance has been carried out to date. UNEP is considered by some as 
“one of the most impressive UN organizations in terms of its actual achievements,”9 
”10 ”11“generally well-regarded, “relatively effective, and “given its mandate, its resources, 
and its authority . . . a remarkable success.”12 It is also characterized as “relatively obso­
”13 ”14lete, eclipsed in resources and prestige, “under-funded, over-loaded and remote, a 
“peanut-sized”15 “weak agency”16 with “wasted scarce resources [and] a credibility 
gap.”17 However, lacking a systematic evaluation of UNEP’s effectiveness, recommen­
dations for institutional reform will remain inadequate and even misguided. 
This report attempts to evaluate UNEP’s performance more systematically by 
examining its three core functions of an anchor institution – monitoring and assess­
ment; agenda setting and policy processes; and capacity development. The report 
identifies four key factors that have limited UNEP’s ability to fulfill its mandate: for­
mal status, governance, financing structure, and location. Because many of the 
underlying factors are products of decisions made in 1972, the study provides a his­
torical context and gleans lessons for the architects of the environmental governance 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
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system for the 21st century. The report also outlines institutional options and advances 
a set of concrete and operational recommendations for UNEP, as well as for govern­
ments. 
methodology 
This study does not aim to cover UNEP’s performance in all of its mandate functions, 
nor does it intend to assess the effectiveness of UNEP in specific programs and proj­
ects. Rather, it seeks to assess UNEP’s existing role and future potential as an anchor 
institution for the global environment. 
The methodology centers on a two-fold approach: 1) empirical analysis, including 
original surveys, research, and interviews, and 2) desk review, including examination 
18 
These two groups were tar­
geted as the primary audi­of both primary and secondary literature. The results of the analysis were presented 
ences of UNEP’s scientific 
in February 2005 to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in Washington, DC, assessments and information. 
and during the 23rd session of the UNEP Governing Council/Global Ministerial Questions focused on UNEP’s 
strengths and weaknesses as Environment Forum in Nairobi, Kenya. 
an information source, effec-
The original empirical work was undertaken in the fall of 2004 as part of a gradu­ tiveness of information out-
ate course at the School of Forestry & Environmental Studies at Yale University devel- reach, and priorities for 
oped and co-taught by the author. Student teams worked for a three-month period improving monitoring, 
assessment, and information in 2004 on the four key functions in UNEP’s mandate: 1) monitoring, assessment, and 
provision. Although the 
information provision, 2) coordination of the environmental activities in the UN sys- response rate partially hin­
tem, 3) capacity building and technical support, and 4) catalyzing environmental ders the ability to gain a com­
prehensive sample of opin­action. Three additional teams analyzed UNEP’s governance, financing, and human 
ions about the information 
resources. function, the Yale survey 
Two online surveys were developed and executed in December 2004: 1) on UNEP’s response rate is similar to the 
20% return rate to UNEP’s performance in its information and assessment functions and 2) on its internal oper­
own efforts at evaluating the 
ations. The information survey aimed to ascertain UNEP’s challenges and successes impact of the Global 
unavailable through existing published literature. It was distributed to 85 environ- Environmental Outlook report 
ment ministers and 65 staff at NGOs, international organizations, and Global on its audience. UNEP 2004b. 
Environmental Outlook collaborating centers, generating an 18% response rate.18 The 
internal operations survey aimed to obtain demographic information on the staff of 
the organization, the organizational culture, and the implications for UNEP’s per­
formance. The survey was distributed to all UNEP professional staff, generating a 19 
The overall response rate was 
38% response rate from UNEP Headquarters in Nairobi.19 20% and the response rate of 
Over 100 interviews were conducted in person, via telephone, or via e-mail with the various offices contacted 
is as follows: 38% in Nairobi; current and former UNEP staff, international environmental policy experts from aca­
9% in Geneva; 17% in 
demia, government, non-governmental organizations, international organizations Washington ; 5% in Paris; 
(World Bank, WHO, WTO, ILO, UNESCO, GEF), as well as political advisors and 60% in New York; and 11% in 
independent consultants. All interviews will remain anonymous. the Hague. There are several 
UNEP offices with a very Recommendations advanced in this report are based on the analysis of the Yale 
small number of staff which 
class, discussions with numerous interviewees, and feedback from participants at the did not respond.
 
Yale presentations in Washington and Nairobi; however, they ultimately reflect the
 
opinions of the author.
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Monitoring and Assessment 
UNEP was established to “keep under review the world environmental situation” and 
“promote the contribution of the relevant international scientific and other profes- 20 United Nations 1972a [here­
sional communities to the acquisition, assessment, and exchange of environmental inafter G.A. Resolution 2997]. 
knowledge and information.”20 In the area of monitoring and assessment, UNEP is 
expected to “provide policy advice, early warning information on environmental 21 UNEP 1997b [hereinafter 
Nairobi Declaration].threats, and to catalyze and promote international cooperation and action, based on 
the best scientific and technical capabilities available.”21 
22 
Analysis by Yale research 
Figure 1 Total Annual UNEP Publications team using data from the 
22 
United Nations Bibliographic 
Information System. 
23 
A coordinated global network 
of collaborating centers con­
tributes to the GEO process, 
where top-down integrated 
assessment is continuously 
combined with bottom-up 
environmental reporting 
inputs. A significant amount 
of analysis of spatial and sta-
Year tistical data comes from 
GRID, within UNEP. Other 
Unlike the WMO or WHO in their respective fields, UNEP does not perform any data centers like GEMS-Water 
and WCMC work very closely direct monitoring and surveillance of its own. Rather, it collects, collates, analyzes, 
with governments and other 
and integrates data from UN agencies and other organizations – including conven- scientific institutions to col­
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See UNEP 2004a [hereinafter 
SWOT Analysis], and UNEP 
2004b citing a producer of a 
six-part BBC world service 
radio program based on 
GEO-2000. 
26 
UNEP 2005d, p.12. 
27 




It is important to note, how­
ever, that these are self-
reported trends. A more 
accurate measure of 
enhanced credibility and rep­
utation would be through a 
survey of change in percep­
tion by organizations work­
ing with the UNEP 
Collaborating Centers. 
UNEP’s assessments are highly recognized in the field and have served not 
only as tools for environmental information but also as tools for capacity 
building within collaborating centers around the world. In order to serve as 
the anchor institution for the environment in monitoring and assessment, 
however, UNEP will need to focus more resources into addressing several 
key challenges. Data comparability, information quality and coherence, and 
UNEP’s internal capacity need to be enhanced along with the capacity for 
data collection and analysis in the developing world. 
unep’s global environment assessment authority 
UNEP is considered relatively effective in its assessment of global environmental 
issues.24 Its flagship environmental assessment publication – the Global Environ­
mental Outlook (GEO) – has been noted as “one of the two most respected environ­
mental outlook publications currently available.”25 The GEO process has become an 
important model for developing and improving the scientific credibility, political rel­
evance, and legitimacy of UNEP’s assessment function.26 GEO utilizes an approach 
based on collaboration, involving universities, research centers, international insti­
tutes, and NGOs in 30 countries representing regions around the world. It also 
employs a periodic review process through an online user survey soliciting external 
feedback and an informal, self-reflective internal review. 
This comprehensive global state of the environment report has been widely cited 
as useful for identifying major emerging environmental issues and for placing nation­
al issues in a broader perspective, raising the awareness of policy makers, scientists 
and the general public of the large-scale processes and trends of the global environ­
ment. 
The GEO process’ most important contributions have been in influencing policy 
formulation, catalyzing action, and developing institutional capacity. Regional gov­
ernmental forums and national governments have adopted GEO methodology for the 
production and/or improvement of their State of the Environment reporting. In 
countries where no such reporting was carried out (for example, Cuba, Peru, Costa 
Rica, Barbados, Gabon, Senegal, Congo, Ghana, and Cameroon among others28), the 
GEO process has catalyzed national State of the Environment reports (see Map 1). 
Several collaborating centers reported that participation in the GEO process has led 
to an improvement in the quality of products and services offered, increased satisfac­
tion among center stakeholders, and enhanced credibility and reputation.29 In some 
centers, it has also helped to attract additional staff and to develop new skills and 
knowledge for staff members. Map 1 shows the geographic spread of GEO 
Collaborating Centers and UNEP catalyzed initiatives in monitoring and assessment. 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
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Map 1 GEO Collaborating Centers and UNEP Catalyzed Initiatives
UNEP HQ Selected UNEP GEO Collaborating Centers
Catalyzed Initiatives 
30 
UNEP 2004a; Yale research 
team. 
One of GEO’s key limitations is the lack of comparative data across countries. While 
the report provides comprehensive information by issue and broad geographic area, 
it does not show the comparative performance of countries around the world in 
addressing environmental challenges. The data, therefore, are not utilized to their full 
capacity for informing policy decisions. It is through comparison across jurisdictions 
that progress is encouraged both among the leaders and the laggards. Box 1 (next 
page) illustrates recent efforts at developing environmental sustainability indicators. 
Box 1 Comparative Environmental Data 
The Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI), developed by the Yale Center 
for Environmental Law and Policy and the Center for International Earth 
Science Information Network (CIESIN) at Columbia University, bench­
marks the ability of nations to protect the environment.31 With 76 data sets 
31 
See http://www.yale.edu/esi. 
The ESI has received interna­compiled into 21 indicators, the ESI ranks 146 countries from best to worst 
tional attention as the lead-
environmental performance, permitting comparison across a range of issues. ing measure of environmen-
Measuring environmental quality in absolute terms is arguably impossible tal sustainability, with more 
than 1 million website hits for and remains elusive. However, relative measures are achievable. National 
the 2005 ESI Report. Accessed 
governments are finding it useful and instructive to compare their perform- August 2005. 
ance to that of others who are similarly situated. Identifying leaders and lag­
gards puts pressure on underperforming countries to improve results. No
 
country scores very high or very low on all indicators. Therefore, “every soci- 32
 Esty, Levy, Srebotnjak, and de 
ety has something to learn from benchmarking its environmental perform- Sherbinin 2005, p.2. 
ance against relevant peer countries.”32 
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UNEP 2005d, p.10. An exam­
ple cited by governments in 
the report is in the area of 
health and the environment, 
in which various United 
Nations institutions and 
other organizations are 
active and potentially dupli­
cating efforts. 
34 
UNEP 2004a, p.13. 
35 
UNEP 2004a, p.23. 
strategic challenges and improvements 
UNEP is the natural forum for the creation of a coherent international system for 
environmental information and assessment. It offers the advantage of building on an 
existing institution with a clear mandate to serve as an information clearinghouse 
and a relatively strong scientific track record. While the GEO process and its outputs 
are notable, a number of strategic challenges remain in the monitoring and 
assessment of global environmental conditions. On a broader level, fragmentation 
and the resulting duplication among the various monitoring and assessment 
activities within UNEP have prevented it from becoming the anchor institution for 
the environment within the international system. Within UNEP, activities regarding 
information and scientific assessment are spread across all eight divisions of the 
organization. Collection, processing, and dissemination of information are further 
allocated to a number of other UNEP-operated global scientific data centers. The 
problem is compounded at the international level where duplication of 
environmental assessments performed by other UN agencies and NGOs runs 
rampant. Stakeholders recognize this as a serious problem,33 yet little is done to 
address the reasons for the failure to effectively coordinate activities or to formulate 
concrete strategies to overcome existing constraints. 
Collaboration and coordination do not just happen. They have to be encour­
aged, facilitated, and sustained. This requires a fundamentally different sys­
tem of incentives for international organizations and governments, where 
long-term vision and strategy are rewarded over narrowly focused projects 
with immediate outputs. 
On a more specific level, UNEP should focus on improving the quality of both 
incoming and outgoing information. Inconsistent use of scientific quality assurance 
and quality control protocols in information and data management lead to unreliable 
output quality and relevance.34 Missing data limit UNEP’s ability to compile compre­
hensive international environmental assessments, draw conclusions, and make scien­
tifically-based policy recommendations. They also impair the credibility of UNEP’s 
work in the eyes of users.35 
In the GEO process, these problems are to a great extent due to the lack of suffi­
cient capacity and to resource constraints both within UNEP and at country level 
where data collection and analysis are performed. Methodological issues related to 
data management and analysis, indicator development, and integrated policy analy­
sis have further hampered information quality. Addressing many of today’s pressing 
environmental issues requires the integration of socio-economic factors with more 
traditional environmental science data, thus creating a demand for a more compre­
hensive approach and extensive institutional capacity in both the contributing and 
receiving organizations. 
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In the same vein, environmental information coming out of UNEP needs to be con­
siderably improved in terms of coherence and accessibility. Currently, information is 
scattered and disorganized. The public cannot use UNEP’s publications and benefit 
from the organization’s work to the fullest extent due to the lack of a single easily 
accessible, searchable, and sortable database or catalog of publications. For example, a 
user seeking information from UNEP on a single topic would have to search nine pub­
lication catalogs and the online UN database just to find everything published between 
1990 and 2000. These catalogs are repetitive, incomplete, and often unclear. Existing 
databases, such as  GRID, WCMC, and UNEP.net, are rife with data holes and incon­
sistencies.36 UNEP’s current capacity is not adequate to perform the function of a 36 Test trials carried out by the 
Yale research team in late coherent clearinghouse for environmental information, highlighting “best practices” 
2004 revealed that of the 
and promoting “information sharing” among countries. Significant institutional thirteen major GRID web-
investment will be required to enhance this core function for UNEP. sites, two did not direct users 
Throughout all levels of its monitoring and assessment function, UNEP will also to a working site and seven 
of the remaining eleven sites need to increase its own capacities in expertise, resources, and flexibility in order to 
had less than six pieces of 
effectively perform a collaborative and coordinated assessment process. Its current data. Individual website links 
institutional capacity for monitoring and assessment requires considerable enhance- worked at a 75% success rate. 
ment for the organization to fulfill its anchor role.37 To secure this leading role in envi­
ronmental science, information, and monitoring, UNEP will need to significantly 37 UNEP 2005d, p.12. 
improve its capacity for collection and analysis of comparative data, better leverage 
its large number of collaborating organizations, and raise the priority of this function 
within the organization. 
Most importantly, UNEP needs to attract the most qualified scientific experts in 
the key environmental issue areas – water, air, climate, biodiversity, forestry, and 
desertification – as well as a number of policy staff in order to explicitly strengthen 
the linkages between environmental trends and policy options. The GEO team at 
Headquarters, for example, comprises only three professional staff, whose expertise 
cannot cover the full range of environmental and technical issues. A team of highly 
qualified technical experts is also urgently needed to develop, design, and maintain 
the data portals and websites. Attracting high quality staff and investing in program 
activities would require at least a doubling of DEWA’s annual budget of $US16 mil­
lion.38 Currently, with 76% of the funds spent on staff salaries,39 little is left for pro-
38 
See UNEP 2005b where the 
biennial budget for 2004­grammatic activities. 
2005 is $US32.5 million. The 
proposed amount for 2006­
2007 is $US37.7million. 
When UNEP’s work becomes the standard for quality, relevance, timeliness, 39 
See UNEP 2005b, p.45. Total 
and accessibility in the environmental field, the organization will have expenditures for established 
posts for 2004-2005 amount 
begun to serve as the anchor institution for the global commons. This, how- to $US24.9 million out of 
$US32.5 million biennialever, will require targeted and stable investment both from UNEP and from 
budget. 
governments. 
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Agenda Setting and Managing Policy 
Processes 
Another important function critical to an anchor institution is agenda setting and 
management of intergovernmental processes to address key issues and to gain agree­
ment on standards, policies, and guidelines. 
Setting goals and priorities and coordinating efforts for their attainment
 
have been problematic for UNEP.40 40 Desai 2001.
 
In some cases, such as the protection of the ozone layer, UNEP has initiated mul­
tilateral environmental agreements that have led to standards, policies, and guidelines 
for the stewardship of the global environment. But on other critical issues, notably 
climate change, UNEP has played a backseat role. With the increasing number of 
treaties and institutions responsible for their administration, coordination of over­
lapping efforts has emerged as an issue of paramount importance. UNEP has not suc­
ceeded in becoming the central forum for debate and deliberation in the environ­
mental field, like the WTO for trade or the WHO for health. A complex and cross­
cutting issue, the environment may indeed be difficult to encompass within one 
organization. The fragmentation of policy processes, however, has had a largely detri­
mental impact on the effectiveness of global environmental governance.41 
UNEP was designed as an advocacy organization at the international level. It was 
expected to be proactive and set the global agenda by identifying emerging concerns 
and galvanizing action around them from governments, international organizations, 
NGOs, and business. UNEP’s original mandate calls on its Secretariat “[t]o submit to 
the Governing Council, on its own initiative or upon request, proposals embodying 
medium-range planning for United Nations programs in the field of the 
”42environment.
41 
Bernstein and Ivanova forth­
coming. 
42 
United Nations 1972a. 
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45 
United Nations 1997, p.2. 
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The 2006-07 UNEP Draft 
Programme of Work, for 
example, contains a detailed 
description of outputs for 
subprograms, including cita­
tion of relevant mandate(s) 
and any trust funds or ear­
marked contributions to sup­
port the output. It comprises 
a vast array of projects, publi­
cations, meetings, processes, 
services, symposia, studies, 
and training events. However, 
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than a set of harmonized ini­
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plish a set of focused priori­
ties over the planning period. 
See http://www.unep.org/ 
gc/gc23/index-flash.asp. 
Accessed August 2005. 
47 
Campbell and Hushagen 2002. 
UNEP’s visionary capacity was seriously damaged during and after the Rio 
Earth Summit as the organization lost its leading role in the environmental 
field.The creation of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Commission 
for Sustainable Development (CSD) detracted from UNEP’s authority as an 
anchor institution, through financial superiority in the case of the GEF and con­
vening power in a key location (New York City) in the case of the CSD.43 
In fact, GEF has become the major financing instrument for projects on the glob­
al environment and, until the establishment of the Global Ministerial Environment 
Forum in 1999, the CSD was the major forum for environmental ministers around 
the world. The environmental debate was thus taking place in New York at the CSD 
and in the Second Committee of the UN General Assembly rather than in Nairobi at 
UNEP Headquarters.44 
UNEP’s attempts to cover a vast number of priorities, often under pressure from 
governments, and its risk-averse attitude have prevented it from establishing a solid 
brand name that would give it the freedom to act as a leader by setting the global 
environmental agenda and taking action to attain it. Rather, it has been continuously 
challenged in its leadership position, as noted in an internal evaluation by the United 
Nations Office for Internal Oversight Services: 
The basic issue facing UNEP is the clarification of its role . . . It is  not clear 
to staff or to stakeholders what that role should be. The lack of clarity has 
had consequences for how programmes have been conceived and managed, 
for the ongoing downsizing of programmes and for staff morale and esprit 
de corps. Management’s first responsibility should be to focus on this new 
role, anchoring it to fewer priorities so as to increase the organization’s effec­
tiveness and its potential for impact.45 
Although considerable improvements have been initiated in the last few years, a 
sense of prioritization is still lacking.46 UNEP’s planning process is in many ways 
driven by the influence of individual states asserting their own priorities. The orga­
nization’s dependence on voluntary contributions creates governance challenges, par­
ticularly with respect to the establishment of priorities, allocation of resources, and 
execution of programs. 
Furthermore, governing bodies find it relatively easy to add new programs and 
activities but find it very difficult to achieve consensus on what to stop doing. This 
can lead to significant pressure on the Secretariat, which is faced with increasing 
demands and often decreasing resources.47 For example, in the area of capacity build­
ing, no core set of priorities has been established leading to excessive demands from 
national governments on UNEP’s own capacity to deliver. The result has been the 
proliferation of projects with no overall strategic vision or coherent action plan. 
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Thus far, UNEP has not successfully defined its long-term goals, which limits its 
ability to set the global environmental agenda. The organization does not have a work 
plan beyond the next two-year planning cycle, which prevents it from taking on chal­
lenges that demand extended commitments to action. UNEP does not regularly 
undertake comprehensive strategic planning, a standard practice for other interna­
tional organizations and companies. Instead, longer-term strategies are developed in 
an ad-hoc manner, elaborated only for in-house brainstorming and guidance. 
UNEP’s failure to articulate a vision for the future of global environmental 
governance inhibits its ability to attract both financial and political support 
for the organization’s agenda. 
The existence of a clear and coherent institutional vision and long-term planning 
has enabled other international organizations to serve as stronger anchor institutions 
in their fields. The WHO, for example, has been able to reject funds that do not 
advance its long-term strategic vision and instead focus government contributions on 
a set of key priorities. Without a long-term strategy for accomplishing goals, it is dif- 48 United Nations 1997. 
ficult to raise the necessary funds. The withdrawal of financial support from UNEP 
after the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 is to a great extent due to the organization’s inabil- 49 
United Nations 1972a. 
ity to carve out a prominent role within the new institutional landscape. As the Office 
for Internal and Oversight Services observed in 1997, a vicious circle of limited funds 
50 
The Environment Co-ordina­and limited effectiveness had deterred UNEP from enlarging its visionary capacity 
tion Board (ECB), comprised 
and raising the necessary resources throughout much of its existence.48 of Executive Heads of the UN 
UNEP’s anchor role demands that it serve as the center of gravity in a complex sys- agencies under the chair­
manship of the UNEP tem of international environmental governance. Resolution 2997 clearly outlined 
Executive Director, was man­
UNEP’s coordination function to “provide general policy guidance for the direction dated to meet periodically to 
and co-ordination of environmental programmes within the United Nations sys- ensure “co-operation and co­
tem,”49 and endowed the organization with specific institutional mechanisms by ordination among all bodies 
concerned in the implemen­establishing an Environment Co-ordination Board.50 Constrained by its relatively 
tation of environmental pro­
lower-rank status within the UN system, its limited financial and human resources, grammes.” In addition, the 
and its geographical remoteness, however, UNEP has not been able to fulfill its coor- ECB was responsible for 
reporting annually to UNEP’s dination mandate effectively. 
Governing Council and fell 
under the auspices of the 
Administrative Committee 
on Co-ordination. Coordination of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and coordi­
nation of the environmental activities of other international organizations 
51 
See von Moltke 2001b, p.1. 
has been a “mission impossible.”51 
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In the last thirty years, UNEP has played a highly-regarded lead role in establish­
ing an extensive system of international environmental law52 through the creation of 
environmental conventions (also known as multilateral environmental agreements – 
MEAs), assistance to developing countries in creating environmental law, and soft-
law guidelines for a wide range of sectors. Once launched, however, the conventions 
have become autonomous entities, each with its own Conference of the Parties, 
Secretariat, and associated subsidiary bodies that have autonomous influence often 
exceeding that of UNEP. 
Despite the successful creation of international agreements, “the flourishing of new 
international institutions poses problems of coordination, eroding responsibilities 
and resulting in duplication of work as well as increased demand upon ministries and 
government.”53 UNEP has undertaken efforts at greater coherence and coordination of 
the numerous MEAs but with limited success.54 For example, UNEP initiated a process 
of harmonization of reporting requirements for the five biodiversity related conven­
tions (Convention on Biological Diversity, CITES, Convention on Migratory Species, 
the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, and the World Heritage Convention) and the 
two regional seas conventions with biodiversity related protocols (Barcelona and the 
Cartagena Conventions). While a common website and a biodiversity clearinghouse 
mechanism have been established, there has been little substantive progress toward 
the practical implementation of a common reporting framework. 
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Coordination among the conventions has been difficult, if not impossible, as 
UNEP has little if any formal authority over them and is geographically far removed 
from their independent secretariats.55 No incentives exist for integrated activities 
between the conventions and UNEP. Efforts have been “piecemeal rather than the 
result of a deliberate, overarching strategic choice”56 and, as one convention secre­
tariat put it, “considerable lip service is paid to the synergies paradigm but, when it 
comes to implementation, each convention continues to be inward-looking and 
”57afraid of sharing or giving away part of their sovereignty.
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
agenda setting and managing policy processes 25 
Furthermore, UNEP’s ability to lead coordination activities has been severely lim­
ited by its lack of formal authority over the secretariats and Conference(s) of the 
Parties. The handful of MEAs that are nested within UNEP have fairly independent 
administrative arrangements presenting a serious operational challenge for UNEP’s 
coordination role. For example, UNEP staff need to travel on average approximately 
3,777 miles from Nairobi to UNEP-hosted convention secretariats. In contrast, other 
international organizations, including the International Maritime Organization, the 
International Labor Organization, and the UN Economic Commission for Europe, 
provide an institutional home for the conventions that have emerged under their 
aegis. 
Proliferation of agreements with various governing bodies and requirements is 
imposing an increasing burden on all countries, but especially so on developing 
nations with limited human, institutional, and financial capacities. A more coherent 
and effective system for the governance of global commons would ensure that devel­
oping countries’ priorities – poverty eradication and development – figure promi­
nently within environmental governance. A set of clear and enforceable rules would 
also ensure that fairness and equity in terms of benefit and burden sharing are built 
in and that decisionmaking is based on democratic principles. 
Developing countries stand to benefit most from reform in the current sys­
tem for global environmental governance and the move toward a more 
coherent and rule-based institutional structure. 
Coordination of the environmental activities of international organizations has 
posed a significant challenge to UNEP as an anchor institution for a number of 
reasons. 
First, the explosion in the number of international organizations has overwhelmed 
the series of UNEP-driven coordination bodies and mechanisms, which have yielded 
few results.58 As often pointed out by UN officials, “Everyone wants to coordinate but 
no one wants to be coordinated.” 
Second, other UN bodies have refused to accept UNEP’s mandate to coordinate all 
environmental activities in the UN system due to “institutional seniority.” A number 
of UN agencies (ILO, FAO, UNESCO, WHO, WMO, IMCO, IAEA, ICAO, and UNDP) 
possessed environmental responsibilities before UNEP was created and thus feel less 
of a need to defer to UNEP. 
Third, the fear of losing certain parts of one’s work program, budget, and staff if 
duplication were eliminated leads agencies to jealously guard their “sovereignty” 
without a view of the broader public good. 
Fourth, UNEP’s approach to coordination was perceived as controlling and 
threatening. For example, UNEP’s earliest heavy-handed attempts (mid-to-late 1970s) 
at coordination drove the WMO to send out a memo warning others of “this upstart 
agency’s plans to take over everyone’s work.” This has led to strained relations and 
58 
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turf wars among the agencies, compromising UNEP’s role as an anchor institution 
with the mandate to manage broader policy processes. Subsequently, “UNEP could 
no more be expected to ‘coordinate’ the system-wide activities of the UN than could 
”59a medieval monarch ‘coordinate’ his feudal barons. The ultimate result has been 
proliferation of institutional arrangements, meetings and agendas. These “substantial 
overlaps, unrecognized linkages and gaps”60 have hampered policy coherence and 
synergy, amplifying the negative impact of already limited resources.61 
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Capacity Development 
UNEP has begun to reinvent its work programs to appeal to donors and recipients 
alike by putting a new emphasis on capacity development initiatives. Although 
UNEP’s mandate clearly prescribes that its core strategies be normative and catalytic, 
the organization now views implementation as its primary strategy.62 However, by 
shifting from a normative and catalytic function to an implementation and opera­
tional role, UNEP has moved from being proactive to being reactive. The focus on 
implementation – while critical and necessary – has put the emphasis on reacting to 
specific country needs and circumstances. 
With a small staff and minimal resources, UNEP is no match for agencies 
like UNDP or the World Bank. With field offices in every country around the 
world, annual budgets in the billions, and a strong reputation, it is UNDP 
and the World Bank that set the agenda, locally as well as globally. UNEP 
cannot and should not function as a full-fledged operational agency. The 
institutional space is filled and UNEP does not have the capacity for such a 
role. However, a purely normative role is also insufficient and even unnec­
essary, as concrete results are increasingly needed. The pressures to continue 
moving in a more operational direction will continue to grow. 
There is an overall “treaty fatigue” among governments and increasing calls for 
concrete assistance with implementation instead. In particular, developing country 
governments now regularly demand financial and technical assistance with imple­
menting multilateral environmental agreements rather than the development of new 
norms or guidelines. In addition, concrete accomplishments on the ground are the 
clearest evidence of success, and completed projects have become the hard currency 
for governments. It is therefore much easier to mobilize funds for tangible products 
than for normative or catalytic activities. Many capacity-building projects are 
requested by governments, compelling UNEP to pursue the work although it lacks 
62 
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the human and financial capacity to do so effectively. Availability of funding from the 
GEF to three implementing agencies – the World Bank, UNDP, and UNEP – has also 
pushed UNEP toward increased operational activities. Since the late 1990s, the GEF 
has accounted for the largest increase in UNEP income and the GEF division in 
UNEP has developed as an almost autonomous body.63 
UNEP recognizes the challenges in finding a balance between its normative man­
date and the operational demands it faces. A High-Level Open-Ended 
Intergovernmental Working Group was established in March 2004 to improve 
UNEP’s capacity-building efforts, resulting in the adoption of the Bali Strategic Plan 
for Technology Support and Capacity Building.64 The Bali Plan aims to strengthen 
the capacity of governments to: (1) participate fully in the development of coherent 
international environmental policy; (2) comply with international agreements; (3) 
achieve their environmental goals and environment-related development goals, 
including the Millennium Development Goals; (4) and develop national research, 
monitoring, and assessment capacity as well as establish infrastructure for scientific 
analysis and environmental management.65 
The essence of the Bali Plan lies in coordination, cooperation, and partnerships. 
The strategic premise is that efforts should build on existing institutions and be 
“coordinated, linked, and integrated with other sustainable development initiatives 
through existing coordination mechanisms.”66 The Plan underlines the need for 
improved inter-agency coordination and cooperation based on transparent and reli­
able information. It does not, however, clarify the respective roles for UNEP, UNDP, 
and the World Bank, which have become more like competitors than partners. 
For some, the strategy in the Bali Plan marks the return of an issue-based philos­
ophy and a shift from the function-based organizational structure and priorities. For 
others, the Bali Plan is the only means to enhance UNEP’s profile and brand name as 
the leading organization in the environmental domain. Comprehensive in its nature, 
the Plan addresses many of the most important challenges facing UNEP in the core 
areas of its mandate. It offers few concrete solutions, however. 
UNEP’s role could be envisioned as a two-fold technical cooperation role: it 
should supervise, lead, and be responsible for general environmental capac­
ity building, in particular in the areas of instruments for environmental 
management and implementation of MEAs. In addition, UNEP should act as 
the environmental conscience of others, in particular the sister agencies of 
the UN system. 
UNEP can thus act as an environmental management clearinghouse designed to 
collect and disseminate information on best practices, policy successes, and on new 
technology and relevant private and intergovernmental partners. This could include 
regional training and awareness-raising functions as well. 
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The Environmental Management Group (EMG) appears to be the existing coordi­
nation mechanism most suitable for building capacity for coordination. Created in 
1999 as a UN system-wide mechanism, the EMG convenes various UN agencies, con­
vention secretariats, and the Bretton Woods institutions under the chairmanship of 
the UNEP Executive Director (see Figure 4). 
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The goal of the EMG is to “promote inter-linkages, encourage timely and relevant	 Available at 
http://www.unemg.org/. exchange of data and information on specific issues and compatibility of different 
Accessed August 2005. 
approaches to finding solutions to those common problems, and contribute to the 
synergy and complementarity among and between activities of its members in the 
field of environment and human settlements.”68 Its main focus in 2004 was capacity 
69 
For example, the Chief 
Executives Board, the High building with the objective of facilitating information exchange and experiences and 
Level Committee on 
identifying synergies among UN agencies and treaty secretariats. High-level political Programmes, the High Level 
commitment, however, has been difficult to attract. Committee on Management, 
the UN Development Group, Three core reasons underpin the lack of strong engagement in the work of the 
and the UN Executive 
EMG. First, a number of parallel forums exist in the UN system, putting excessive Committees on Economic 
demands on the time and resources of top management.69 Second, the EMG is still and Social Affairs and on 
Humanitarian Affairs all con-perceived as an instrument for UNEP’s control rather than as a crosscutting mecha­
vene senior officials of inter­
nism for mutually beneficial collaboration. Third, the severely limited capacity of the governmental organizations 
EMG (two professional staff and an annual budget of $0.5 million) prevents the insti- for coordination purposes. 
tution from taking bold initiatives and effectively performing coordination activities. 
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In the 1970s and ’80s, UNEP devoted 30% of its annual budget to coordinating envi­
ronmental activities of other organizations. Currently, the EMG spends over 90% of 
its $0.5 million budget on staff salaries and internal operations and no resources 
within UNEPs budget are specifically earmarked for coordination activities. Thus, 
EMG is rendered virtually ineffective, although it has the institutional and structural 
capacity to serve as the foundation for a clearinghouse mechanism. 
Coordination has perennially been the weakest link in UNEP. Any new ini­
tiative to improve this area needs to seriously examine the reasons behind 
this challenge. 
Through the EMG, UNEP could use its comparative advantage as a normative 
agency and serve as an authoritative think tank on various environmental concerns 
and capacity development. It could receive direct input from and reach out to inter­
national organizations, governments, non-governmental organizations, business, and 
citizens. EMG’s location in Geneva presents a significant opportunity through formal 
and informal communications with 22 international organizations headquartered in 
Geneva, including the WTO, ILO, and WHO; treaty secretariats; the missions of 
almost all national governments; and the representatives of NGOs and business from 
around the world. Notably, Geneva has a higher concentration of developing coun­
tries representatives than Nairobi, for example, because of the high density of inter­
national agencies.70 
In addition, UNEP holds a unique leadership advantage in the system at the 
regional level. It is at this level that UNEP can be proactive both in a normative and 
in an operational manner. Through its network of established regional offices, UNEP 
can facilitate the adoption of regional norms adapted from global agreements and 
serve as a matchmaker between donors and recipients in environmental capacity 
building. 
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Limiting Factors 
Several key factors have limited UNEP’s performance as anchor institution for the 
global environment: (1) UNEP’s status as a Programme rather than a Specialized 
Agency within the UN system has limited its authority and standing; (2) UNEP’s gov­
ernance arrangements, including the Committee of Permanent Representatives and 
the Governing Council, have constrained its autonomy and leadership; (3) UNEP’s 
financing structure has led to complete dependence on voluntary funds resulting in a 71 Organizations in the UN with
Programme or similar Fundhigh degree of unpredictability and volatility of resources as well as openness to 
status include the United 
excessive member state influence on the organization’s agenda; and finally (4)	 Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), Office ofUNEP’s location away from the centers of political activity have hampered its ability 
the United Nations High
to coordinate the specialized agency, to assert itself as the central actor in global envi- Commissioner for Refugees
ronmental, and to attract and retain the most highly-qualified policy staff. (UNHCR), United Nations
Children's Fund (UNICEF),
United Nations Population
formal status	 Fund (UNFPA), and World
Food Programme (WFP). 
In the UN hierarchy, Programmes have the least independence and authority as they 72 Some of the specialized
are subsidiary organs of the General Assembly.71 Specialized Agencies, on the other agencies include the Food
and Agriculture Organization
hand, are separate, autonomous intergovernmental organizations with governing (FAO), World Health Organi­
bodies independent of the UN Secretariat and the General Assembly.72 Besides their zation (WHO), World Meteor­
ological Organization (WMO),role in elaborating common vision, rules, and standards, they also perform many International Bank for Recon­
operational activities within the particular sector they govern. The vision for UNEP	 struction and Development
(World Bank), Internationalin 1972, however, was for a new type of governing body. 
Maritime Organization (IMO),
UN Educational, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), and UN IndustrialUNEP was not intentionally constituted as a Programme to diminish its	 Development Organization
(UNIDO). power. Recognizing the complex nature of environmental issues, govern-
Ivanova 2005. ments sought to create a lean, flexible, and agile entity that could pull 
73 
together the relevant expertise housed in the various agencies and deploy 
it effectively.73 
The new entity was expected to grow into its mandate as it proved its effectiveness 
and be “essentially flexible and evolutionary so as to permit adaptation to changing 
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infringe on its domestic deci­
sion-making processes,
Britain did not set out to cre­
ate a weak environmental 
organization. Rather, it
accepted that the time had
come for new institutional 
arrangements. In the words
of an official from the 
Environment Department, a
“new and expensive interna­
tional organisation must be
avoided, but a small effective 
central coordinating mecha­
nism...would not be welcome 
but is probably inevitable”
(cited in Hamer 2002). 
75 
United Nations 1972b. 
needs and circumstances.”74 The establishment of UNEP as a specialized agency was 
deemed counterproductive, since it would make the environment another “sector” 
and marginalize it. As Maurice Strong, the Secretary General of the 1972 Stockholm 
Conference, put it, the core functions could “only be performed at the international 
level by a body which is not tied to any individual sectoral or operational responsi­
bilities and is able to take an objective overall view of the technical and policy impli­
cations arising from a variety of multidisciplinary factors.”75 Furthermore, there was 
a strong sense of disillusionment with the unwieldy bureaucracy of the UN special­
ized agencies. This new body was designed to operate at the core of the UN system – 
best accomplished with the status of Programme, rather than Specialized Agency 
(which, with their semi-autonomous governing mechanisms, operate on the periph­
ery of the UN system). 
While not intentionally diminishing UNEP’s power, the decision to constitute it as 
a Programme rather than a Specialized Agency has impacted its authority. As a result, 
UNEP has not been able to establish the autonomy necessary to become an effective 
anchor institution for the global environment. As new institutions sprang up across 
various levels of governance and many existing ones added substantial environmen­
tal mandates, UNEP could claim little authority over them. For example, the creation 
of the Commission on Sustainable Development and the Global Environmental 
Facility in the early 1990s marginalized UNEP politically and eclipsed it financially. 
The increased emphasis on environmental work at the World Bank, while commend­
able, also led to overlap with UNEP activities. UNEP was unable to coordinate and 
create synergies among the multiple bodies in the environmental arena as its politi­
cal power and resources were dwarfed by newer institutions. Thus, while the choice 
of organizational form did not seek to incapacitate UNEP, the effect has been largely 
negative. As one senior UNEP official exclaimed, UNEP “just does not have a voice in 
front of the larger UN agencies.” 
governance 
Three separate bodies share governance responsibilities for UNEP – the Governing 
Council comprised of 58 member states, the Secretariat headed by the Executive 
Director, and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR) comprised of 
ambassadors to Kenya serving as Permanent Representatives to UNEP. 
UNEP’s governance structure was designed to perform two distinct func­
tions: (1) the external functions of advancing international environmental 
governance by monitoring global environmental trends, setting a consen­
sus global environmental agenda, and establishing global priorities, and (2) 
the internal function of overseeing UNEP’s program, budget, and opera­
tions. In practice, UNEP’s governance structure conflates these two roles. 
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The Governing Council is responsible for both setting the global environmental 
agenda and elaborating UNEP’s work program and budget. This leads to overly politi­
cized institutional governance and a work program that reflects a compilation of indi­
vidual states’ interests rather than a focused, strategic vision. It also prevents UNEP 
from exercising leadership in international environmental governance more broadly, 
as no long-term, bold vision for the system can be elaborated and implemented. 
The responsibilities of the Council of Permanent Representatives (CPR) include 
reviewing UNEP’s draft program of work and budget, monitoring the implementa­
tion of Governing Council decisions, and preparing draft decisions for consideration 
by the Council.76 However, more often than not, these representatives have little 76 UNEP 1997a. 
knowledge of and expertise in environmental issues and have a number of other 
duties in their portfolio.77 The CPR considerably limits the autonomy and power of 77 Exceptions include the 
United States and Sweden, the Secretariat in Nairobi either through direct intervention in UNEP’s work (meet­
which have specially appoint­
ing four times a year to discuss the work program and budget) or through influence ed Permanent Represent-
on UNEP’s staff, whose loyalties often lie with their national governments. atives, often with solid envi-
Advancement within the ranks of national administrations is often contingent on a ronmental backgrounds, 
whose only responsibility is good recommendation from the ambassador at one’s duty station, creating pressure 
to work with UNEP. 
to pursue narrow national interests within the organization. 
A further complication is that, while the CPR directly influences UNEP’s work 
through constant oversight of the organization’s operations, the final say on decisions 
regarding the work program and budget lies not with the CPR, but with the 
Governing Council. Meeting once a year in Nairobi, the Governing Council is sup­
posed to both craft a visionary agenda for international environmental governance at 
the global scale and set the parameters within which UNEP is allowed to operate – 
i.e. its biennial program of work and budget. Typically, a person other than the 
Permanent Representative represents the country at the Governing Council, often the 
environmental minister who flies to Kenya specifically for the week-long session. 
Even though a Permanent Representative to UNEP might have worked on a particu­
lar aspect of the work program for months, his or her recommendations and deci­
sions could be contested by the national representative under this arrangement. 
Unless the CPR’s relationship with the Governing Council is clarified, there will be lit­
tle room for substantially improving UNEP’s performance. 
The problems with the governance structures of UNEP are amplified, moreover, by 
the lack of more advanced administrative rules and procedures within the organization. 
UNEP is a fairly transparent organization and promotes participation by 
NGOs and business in its intergovernmental processes; however, it suffers 
from deficient internal administrative controls — lack of oversight of staff, 
limited enforcement of conflict of interest rules, etc. — leading to a per­
ceived high degree of inefficiency, poor internal governance, and overall 
lack of procedural legitimacy.78 
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79 
See Najam 2003, arguing 
that “UNEP has been denied 
authority and resources.” 
Konrad von Moltke explains, 
“Given an impossible mission 
and a derisory budget, UNEP 
has slowly built an organiza­
tion from program pieces,” 
von Moltke 1996, p. 25. 
80 
UNDP’s budget for 2003. 
http://www.undp.org/annu­
alreports/2004/english/IAR0 
4E.pdf. Accessed August 
2005. 
81 
EPA’s budget for 2005 
http://www.epa.gov/ocfo/bu 
dget/2005/2005bib.pdf. More 
annual budget documents 
can be found at http://www. 
epa.gov/ocfo/budget/. 
Accessed August 2005. 
82 
For a breakdown of the WTO's 
budget for 2004, see 
http://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/secre_e/budget 
04_e.htm. Accessed August 
2005. 
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The GEF budget in Figure 5 
was estimated from the $3 
billion in replenishment 
funds in 2003 used for its 
work program over a four-
year period. The WTO figure 
only accounts for its 
Secretariat’s operations, since 
the WTO does not execute 
any projects of its own. The 
WHO budget information is 
from http://www.who.int/ 
gb/e/e_ppb2003.html. 
Accessed August 2005. The 
OECD budget information 
appears at http://www.oecd. 
org/dataoecd/34/6/34711139. 
pdf. Accessed August 2005. 
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Based on UNEP 2004c and 
the analysis of “UNEP 
Environment Fund contribu­
tions by donor countries” in 
late 2004 by the Yale 
research team. 
financing structure 
UNEP’s limited financial resources are the second primary reason analysts use to 
explain UNEP’s ineffectiveness.79 UNEP’s annual budget of $215 million is indeed 
miniscule compared to UNDP’s $3.2 billion80 and to EPA’s $7.8 billion.81 However, it 
is larger than the budget of the WTO.82 Figure 5 compares the annual budgets of sev­
eral major international organizations and the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency. 
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Figure 5 Comparative Organizational Annual Budgets
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While the disparity in resources is striking, the nominal sum of the budget is a 
symptom of the problem. The root cause of UNEP’s problems is the organization’s 
unique financial structure. 
Unlike other international organizations whose budgets are based on pre­
dictable mandatory assessed contributions, UNEP is completely dependent 
on the voluntary contributions of individual states. 
Only a dozen countries have regularly made annual contributions to the 
Environment Fund since its inception in 1973.84 This unreliable and highly 
discretionary financial arrangement allows for individual donors to dictate UNEP’s 
priorities, which has resulted in a fragmentation of UNEP’s activities and a lack of 
clear prioritization. Furthermore, UNEP’s financial stability, ability to plan beyond 
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the current budget cycle, and autonomy are compromised, thus instilling a risk-
averse attitude within the organization’s leadership. 
In the past ten years, contributions to the Environment Fund have dropped 36% 
and have decreased in real terms since the 1970s and 1980s. Contributions to trust 
funds and earmarked funds directing UNEP into specific activities, on the other 
hand, have increased dramatically. The proportion of restricted financing now com­
prises more than two-thirds of UNEP’s revenue as shown in Figure 6.85 

























This illustrates two important aspects that explain the political dynamics and con­
sequences for UNEP’s performance. First, the decline in contributions to the 
Environment Fund – the central financial mechanism at the discretion of the 
Secretariat – shows that confidence in UNEP has diminished. The Secretariat is being 
deprived of power to initiate and carry out programs it deems necessary and urgent. 
The second key trend – a three-fold increase in overall funding since the 1980s, 
including trust funds, earmarked contributions, and other revenues – shows recog­
nition of the need for international mechanisms and UNEP in particular in address­
ing environmental concerns. 
The diversification trend in financial contributions is clearly illustrated in Figure 
7, which depicts funding from the top five donors to UNEP: the United States (his­
torically the top donor), Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Sweden. For all 
these countries, contributions have shifted from the Environment Fund to other ear­
marked mechanisms and are now roughly equal between the two.
85 
Financial analysis performed 
by the Yale research team 
based on documentation 
provided by UNEP. 
Other (incl. JPO) 
Earmarked Contributions 
UNEP Support to MF 
UN Foundation 
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See Voluntary Indicative 
scale of contributions by 
countries to UNEP’s 
Environment Fund in 2004 – 




Over the past few years under the leadership of Executive Director Klaus Töpfer, a 
voluntary indicative scale of contributions was instituted. This mechanism provides 
an expected level of financial contribution based on the size of a country’s economy 
and has significantly broadened the number of donors. 
In 2003, over 100 countries contributed to UNEP – twice as many as in the mid­
1990s. A number of countries have also increased their contributions compared to the 
mid-1990s. Canada’s contributions to the Environment Fund, for example, increased 
from a record low of $662,000 (USD) in 1997 to almost $2 million in 2004. Canada 
contributed over $1 million from 1994 through 1996 during the tenure of Executive 
Director Elizabeth Dowdeswell, a Canadian national. However, the record giving took 
place in 1977 when Canada contributed $2.5 million (about $6 million in 2000 dol­
lars). Canada’s indicative scale of contribution for 2004-2005 amounts to only $1.7 
million. Although praised as a valuable financial tool, the indicative scale of contri­
butions may, however, be doing a disservice to the organization. 
Several countries are easily meeting their financial targets and have no incentive to 
contribute more. Bulgaria, for example, paid its $6,000 voluntary assessed contribu­
tion in 2003 and 2004 but contributed over $20,000– more than 3 times as much – 
in 1990. Mozambique’s contribution to UNEP as recently as 1998 totaled $10,000, 
while the assessed contribution the country is currently paying amounts to only 
$600. Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Austria, Australia, Kenya, Japan, Hungary, China, and 
many others face similar circumstances.86 
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location 
The decision to locate UNEP in Nairobi was neither a “strategic necessity without 
which developing countries might have never accepted an environmental organ to be 
created”87 nor a way to marginalize the organization and “cannibalize its mandate.”88 
It was not ill intended, premeditated, or the result of a secret bargain. Quite the oppo­
site; it was the outcome of an open ballot vote at the General Assembly in November 
1972. 
Solidarity among developing countries, which outnumbered developed 
countries by far, led to the establishment of the first international organi­
zation in the developing world. The decision was openly political, seeking to 
affirm the role of developing countries as equal partners in multilateral 
affairs. 
87 
Najam 2003, p.374. 
88 
von Moltke 1996, p.54. von 
Moltke asserts, “Lacking 
enthusiastic supporters, 
UNEP’s mandate was canni­
balized. The principal means 
of achieving this goal was to 
provide limited funds divided 
between a minimal institu­
tional budget and a modest 
‘Fund’, to assign it a ‘catalyt­
ic’ function, and to locate it 
away from the decision-mak­
ing centres of the UN sys­
tem.” 
UNEP’s location has influenced the organization significantly. Its ability to effec­
tively coordinate and catalyze environmental action has been inhibited by its geo­
graphical isolation from other relevant UN operations, inadequate long-distance 
communication and transportation infrastructure, and lack of sufficient face-to-face 
interaction with counterparts in other agencies and treaty secretariats. Map 2 illus­
trates the global clustering of key international organizations working on environ­
ment-related activities by highlighting “hotspots” of activity. 
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Map 2 Density of International Organizations Working on Environment-Related Issues
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Yale research team. 
UNEP 
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Yale research team. 
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Ibid. 
UNEP’s headquarters are located far outside the dense political activity “hotspots,” 
posing a challenge to its ability to fulfill the coordination role specified in its mandate. 
UNEP’s offices in Paris, New York, and Geneva, however, have tried to step into a liai­
son-building role. Their “proximity to other organizations and important govern­
ments seems to make these programs among the brighter lights of UNEP achieve­
”90ment.
It is important to note that this spatial analysis of hotspots is focused particularly 
on UNEP’s coordination function, and that for other aspects of UNEP’s mandate – 
such as capacity building – the location may present an opportunity rather than a 
challenge. A demand for greater operational responsibilities for UNEP has emerged 
both from the developing world and from the organization’s staff. UNEP’s expertise 
in institution building, for example, is greatly needed in Africa, and a survey of UNEP 
staff indicates a desire of many in the organization to make on-the-ground impact in 
developing countries.91 Pressing environmental challenges may demand immediate 
on-the-ground action, but this is a mandate that UNEP does not possess. 
The most important consequence of UNEP’s location is the inability to attract and 
retain top-notch staff with the policy expertise and experience necessary to make the 
organization the leading authority in the environmental field. Nairobi is not neces­
sarily a desirable location for staff with the expertise and management qualities that 
UNEP needs. The increasingly treacherous security situation exacerbates this prob­
lem.92 In addition, the remoteness of UNEP has required frequent travel by the 
Executive Director and many senior staff, imposing a significant financial burden, but 
most importantly, creating a leadership vacuum due to prolonged absences from 
Nairobi. Effective management of the organization requires that the leadership be 
present and responsive to staff needs and organizational priorities. 
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
Five key problems beleaguer the current system for global environmental governance: 
incoherence, inefficiency, information inadequacy, inequity, and insufficient fund­
ing.93 Although radical reform may indeed be urgently needed to address these key 
93 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs – 
France 2005. problems, it seems unlikely to transpire. Political emphasis is increasingly being 
placed on working within existing institutions rather than attempting bold new 
designs. As Secretary-General Kofi Annan urged in his 2005 report In Larger Freedom, 
“[i]t is now high time to consider a more integrated structure for environmental stan­
dard-setting, scientific discussion and monitoring treaty compliance. This should be 
built on existing institutions, such as the United Nations Environment Programme, 
94 
United Nations 2005, para 
212.as well as the treaty bodies and specialized agencies.”94 
Yet, a much stronger global voice and conscience for the global environ­
ment is necessary in the form of an accountable, legitimate, and effective 
anchor institution. 
UNEP has a clear mandate to perform the anchor role for the global environment, 
but has done so with only partial success. It has been relatively effective in two key 
areas – monitoring and assessment and launching policy processes for environmental 
agreements. It has also often served as the only international partner of frequently 
marginalized environment ministries in many countries and provided a critical 
forum where they can meet their counterparts. 
However, UNEP has largely fallen short in managing policy processes in a coher­
ent and coordinated fashion. It has failed to establish itself as the institutional home 
for the numerous international environmental conventions. Without a center of grav­
ity, the system of international environmental governance has grown increasingly 
complex and fragmented. UNEP’s inability to fulfill its leadership role is compound­
ed by shortsighted budget considerations, attractive offers by countries eager to host 
new treaty secretariats, and by indifference at the highest political levels to the struc­
ture of global environmental governance. 
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At the core of this dynamic, however, lies a key set of structural decisions. Contrary 
to popular belief among environmental professionals, UNEP was not deliberately set 
up as a weak and ineffective institution, but rather was expected to grow into its man­
date as it proved its effectiveness. 
Four structural choices, while considered right at the time of UNEP’s creation, 
have inhibited UNEP’s performance and growth. 
First, UNEP’s authority has been severely constrained by its status as a Programme 
rather than Specialized Agency within the UN system. 
Second, UNEP’s governance structure had led to more attention to the needs and 
demands of member states than to the mission of the organization. 
Third, UNEP’s financing structure has enabled countries to pursue their own 
interests through UNEP rather than the common good. 
Fourth, UNEP’s physical distance from the centers of political activity has affected 
its capacity to coordinate numerous environment-related agencies as well as, most 
importantly, its ability to attract top-tier policy staff. 
Nevertheless, UNEP offers a potentially strong comparative advantage in 
environmental monitoring, scientific assessment, and information sharing that 
should be developed and utilized fully. It is the natural forum for the creation of a 
coherent international system for environmental monitoring, assessment, 
information, and analysis. However, UNEP can no longer aspire to the lead role for 
every environmental issue since expertise within the system has been diffused over 
the past thirty years with the proliferation of other international organizations and 
non-governmental organizations in the environmental arena. Instead, UNEP could 
effectively lay the foundation for a policy forum where various clusters of agencies 
and networks convene to negotiate and exchange experience. Its leadership in the 
Environmental Management Group could create the policy space for such an 
initiative. A more strategic, prioritized, and long-term capacity development 
approach, drawing on UNEP’s comparative advantage as an information 
clearinghouse and a policy forum, rather than an operational agency, could facilitate 
the implementation of multilateral environmental agreements. 
The initiative by the French and German governments to create a United Nations 
Environment Organization may provide the impetus for a restructuring of the sys­
tem. Simply upgrading UNEP into a United Nations Environment Organization 
(UNEO), however, will not suffice. 
Reform efforts should focus on are how well UNEP has performed these functions, 
underlying factors for its performance, and how any new organization would signif­
icant improve on the current system. Unfortunately, current institutional reform pro­
posals do not substantially depart from the existing UNEP mandate. Table 1 compares 
the functions of UNEP and the proposed UNEO as anchor institutions. 
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Table 1 Comparison of How UNEP and Proposed UNEO Might Fulfill Functions of Anchor Institution 
ANCHOR INSTITUTION FUNCTON UNEP 95 UNEO96 
Monitoring and
Assessment 
● Data and Indicators 
● Monitoring and 
Verification 
● Assessment 
● Information Reporting and 
Exchange 
● Keep under review 
the world environ­
mental situation. 
● Provide policy advice, 
early warning infor­
mation on environ­
mental threats, and to 
catalyze and promote 
international cooper­
ation and action, 
based on the best sci­
entific and technical 
capabilities available. 
● Monitor and provide early 
warning on the state of the 
environment. 
● Provide information, facili­
tate communication, and 
mobilize stakeholders. 
Agenda Setting and Policy
Processes 
● Goal and Priority Setting 
● Rulemaking and Norm 
Development 
● Coordination 
● Dispute Settlement 
● Promote international 
cooperation in the field of 
environment and recom­
mend policies to this end. 
● Provide advisory services 
for the promotion of inter­
national environmental 
cooperation. 
● Bring up any matter that 
requires consideration by 
the Governing Council. 
● Develop international envi­
ronmental law. 
● Coordinate environmental 
programs within the 
United Nations system, 
keep their implementation 
under review and assess 
their effectiveness. 
● Provide a political platform 
for international legal and 
strategic frameworks. 
● Improve coherence and 
coordination, including the 
convergence of norms, 
implementation of interna­
tional obligations and 
financing. 
Capacity Development 
● Education and Training 
● Financing 
● Technical Assistance 
● Institution and Network 
Building 
● Provide policy and adviso­
ry services in key areas of 
institution-building to gov­
ernments and other insti­
tutions. 
● Advance implementation of 
agreed international norms 
and policies and stimulate 
cooperative action. 
● Undertake capacity build­
ing within developing and 
transition countries. 
● Strengthen regional gover­
nance. 
95 
Mandated functions as elab­
orated in GA Resolution 2997 
and Nairobi Declaration. 
96 
See Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs - France 2005  and 
Tarasofsky and Hoare 2004. 
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Reform should be multifaceted and layered, focusing on the core functions 
of effective global environmental governance and devising appropriate 
institutional arrangements. In some cases, it will build on existing frame­
works, in others, new approaches may need to be developed. 
policy options for governments and the united
nations secretary-general 
Although a strategic overhaul of global environmental governance and the strength­
ening of UNEP as an anchor institution are necessary, political viability limits what 
palpable reform can be undertaken. However, governments and the United Nations 
Secretary-General can initiate reforms that are far-reaching, yet build on existing 
institutional successes, improve on organizational weaknesses, and address limiting 
factors. This report makes the following recommendations: 
● Launch a Comprehensive Assessment of Global Environmental Governance 
Any reform of global environmental governance needs to be based on a holistic 
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses in the current system and the 
effectiveness of UNEP in fulfilling its core mission as an anchor institution. A 
comprehensive evaluation of the system of global environmental governance 
would help to clarify the mandates of the numerous existing organizations, 
including those with explicit environmental mandates such as the 
environmental conventions, CSD, and GEF, as well as to reveal their comparative 
advantages and provide a vision for reduced competition and a more productive 
division of labor. This broad assessment should be undertaken with the goal of 
producing an analytically sound and politically visionary set of recommen­
dations on how to strengthen global environmental governance. It should 
elaborate a substantive vision, including priority issues to be addressed and ways 
to do so. The United Nations Secretary-General could initiate such an 
assessment. The assessment would also provide a replicable template for similar 
assessments of the institutional arrangements for other global public goods and 
help lay a solid foundation for UN reform. 
● Create a Global Environmental Information Clearinghouse 
While data gathering should primarily be the function of national organiza­
tions, a central body to establish data protocols and a repository for compre­
hensive and comprehensible information is necessary. A common data portal 
with policy relevant information and analysis will reduce information overload 
and improve problem understanding, generate political attention, and motivate 
national action. A Global Commons Monitoring Report could be developed on 
the basis of the consolidated data, providing a public account of global com­
mons health as well as indicators for country and institutional performance in 
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environmental sustainability. It would directly contribute to the broader Global 
Public Goods (GPG) Monitoring Report suggested by the Secretariat of the 
International Task Force on Global Public Goods.97 97 International Task Force on 
Global Public Goods 
Scientific assessments, monitoring and early warning are UNEP’s major Secretariat 2005. 
strengths and could provide the foundation for an effective global information 
clearinghouse. UNEP’s current administrative, managerial, scientific, and finan­
cial capacity, however, needs to be enhanced. This would require a coherent 
strategy, a clear action plan over a multi-year period, and substantial invest­
ment. It would require that UNEP expand the number of staff involved in this 
function (currently about 30) with an eye toward top quality expertise and at 
least double the $16 million annual budget of the Division of Early Warning and 
Assessment. The newly proposed Environment Watch framework, which aims 
to create a coherent conceptual framework for UNEP’s environmental assess­
ment activities, should be assessed carefully in this context.98 If the concept is 98 UNEP is currently developing 
Environment Watch, “a sys-feasible to implement and shows promise, it should indeed be developed further 
tem for improved monitoring 
into a functioning global environmental information clearinghouse. of the globe’s environment 
which will also strengthen Create a Global Environmental Capacity Clearinghouse ● links between researchers 
Disparate activities of the numerous multilateral and bilateral agencies have and policymakers.” UNEP 
come to drain rather than enhance national capacity. A consolidated source of 2005c. 
information on capacity building for environmental governance needs to be 
created – tracking and planning technical assistance activities, matching the 
“supply” with the “demand” for services, and highlighting best practices on a 
wide range of projects. The capacity clearinghouse would make international 
agencies more efficient and effective, provide a trusted source of information on 
needs and capabilities to donor countries, and ensure a higher quality and quan­
tity of aid to recipient countries. Drawing on the comparative strengths of both 
operational (UNDP and the World Bank) and normative (UNEP) agencies as 
well as on the expertise and resources of the GEF, it could link up to the pro­
posed GPG Financing Framework.99 The institutional home for this mechanism 99 International Task Force on 
Global Public Goods needs to be chosen with care based on comparative advantage, authority, and 
Secretariat 2005. 
legitimacy. 
The Environmental Management Group in Geneva is one possible host, provid­
ed that it is endowed with the necessary internal capabilities. The EMG has
 
focused on capacity building in the course of 2004 in its interagency coordina­
tion efforts and could build further on this initiative. It could begin by estab­
lishing a comprehensive database of capacity building needs and resources.
 
UNEP could add significant value by providing systematic assessment and pri­
oritization of country needs as well as systematic cataloguing and evaluation of
 
resources offered by international agencies and governments. UNEP’s key role
 
would be to act as the environmental conscience in the system stimulating
 
action within its sister agencies. It could also provide direct capacity-building
 
services in areas where it has a comparative advantage such as the strengthening
 
of national environmental institutions.
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El-Ashry 2004, von Moltke 
2001a, 2001c. 
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Joint Programming brought 
together the Designated 
Officials on Environmental 
Matters three times a year in 
addition to periodic meet­
ings among those in a cer­
tain “cluster.” This process 
was “beginning to resemble 
comprehensive UN planning 
in program and resource dis­
tribution.” Eastby 1984, p. 
241. 
102 
Eastby 1984, p. 241-3. 
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● Cluster Institutions 
The premise for institutional clustering is based on the notion that a combined 
effort of agencies according to their comparative advantage will produce greater 
results than the smaller fragmented and often competing efforts of individual 
organizations.100 Positive environmental results are more likely to be attained if 
unproductive duplication of effort is reduced, synergies are captured, and scarce 
resources are pooled. A clustering effort is at heart a coordination approach and 
requires three core capacities in the anchor institution: (1) legitimacy through 
expertise, results, and procedural fairness; (2) top quality communication abili­
ty and location at the center of political activity; and (3) a system of incentives 
(financial as well as reputational). In the contemporary context of institutional 
proliferation, it is imperative that expertise and resources are pooled together 
under the lead of one or two expert institutions. One approach would be to have 
different agencies take the initiative in certain issue areas and form clusters 
around biodiversity, climate change, fisheries, desertification, for example, or 
other existing and emerging issues. 
In the first decade of its operations, UNEP did in fact serve as a lead agency in 
forming such clusters through thematic joint programming with other agen­
cies.101 However, success was not lasting due to the discrepancies in the budget 
cycles of the organizations involved, the scattering of resources, and the remote­
ness of UNEP, which inhibits the regular meetings and informal get-togethers 
that are the sinews of coordination.102 Coordination efforts within GEF and UN 
AIDS have had better results.103 While considerable challenges remain, GEF has 
performed relatively well as a “networked institution” due to its ample funding 
for other agencies, top quality staff expertise and communication ability, as well 
as its location in proximity to the major donors. On the other hand, though UN 
AIDS has “well established itself as a leader and center of knowledge . . . and has 
made significant achievements in advocacy, policy consensus . . . and coordina­
tion,” it has been greatly constrained by the lack of incentives for the core par­
ticipating agencies to develop a genuinely integrated approach.104 
policy options for unep 
Though it is ultimately governments that need to take the initiative to institute the 
above reforms, there are several steps that UNEP itself can take to enhance its role as 
the leading global environmental authority. They range from smaller-scale immedi­
ate efforts, such as improved financial reporting, to broader initiatives, such an exter­
nal strategic review. 
● Initiate an Independent Strategic Review of UNEP’s Role 
An independent strategic review of UNEP should examine UNEP’s role and 
performance within the global environmental governance system. In conjunc­
tion with the comprehensive assessment described in the previous section, such 
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a review should systematically assess the history and performance of the organ­
ization, outline current and future needs and trends, and define scenarios for 
action based on sound assessment of progress to date, constraints, and oppor­
tunities. It would facilitate a transition to more accountable leadership and 
improvement in key management practices. Several international organizations 
have performed regular evaluations of their own performance. GEF, for exam­
ple, has undergone three external evaluations in its 14-year life. The 
Performance Studies are commissioned by the GEF Council to “assess the extent 
to which GEF has achieved, or is on its way towards achieving its main objec­
tives, as laid down in the GEF Instrument and subsequent decisions by the GEF 
Council and the Assembly.”105 For UN AIDS, the essence of the Five-Year 
Evaluation was also to determine the extent to which the Joint Programme was 
meeting expectations on issues surrounding the HIV/AIDS epidemic and on the 
coordination of the United Nations inter-agency collaborative response.106 
UNEP’s Executive Director should initiate a similar strategic review of the 
organization and request that an independent commission be established for 
this purpose to undertake the task. 
● Consolidate Financial Accounting and Reporting 
Comprehensive and clear financial reporting is critical to building and main­
taining the confidence of donors. While UNEP keeps good track of funding 
sources by individual and aggregated formats, its expenditures are not reported 
in a consolidated fashion. Expenditure reports should indicate expenditures in 
terms of mandated functions – capacity building, information, coordination, 
catalyzing – as well as by individual environmental issues so that members 
states and donors can understand how UNEP as a whole is expending money 
and effort. 
● Restructure Organizational Governance 
Currently, UNEP’s Governing Council/Global Ministerial Environmental 
Forum (GC/GMEF) performs both of the governance functions UNEP needs: 
providing leadership to international environmental governance and overseeing 
UNEP’s program and budget. Performing both roles leads to circumscribed 
leadership and circular decision making in which programs and budget drive 
priorities and strategies rather than global needs. If UNEP is to live up to its 
mandated leadership role, an inclusive structure like the Global Ministerial 
Environment Forum is required to review global issues, assess global needs and 
spot gaps, identify global priorities, and develop strategies to address priorities. 
The internal oversight role is best performed by a smaller, more efficient body 
with greater discipline and focus on the program of work, budget, management 
oversight, and program evaluation. This report recommends the creation of an 
Executive Board of no more than 20 members, comprising – if committed to 
innovation – representatives of both member states and civil society. 











For a detailed discussion of 
an Executive Board, see Forss 
2004. 
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See Esty and Ivanova 2002a. 
This would entail the elimination or restructuring of the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives and the 58-member Governing Council. While 
politically challenging, such a restructuring is fundamental to effective reform. 
The leadership of governments will be critical in this task. 
In designing a new global environmental architecture, form should follow func­
tion. The institutional recommendations proposed in this report need not add 
a new layer of international bureaucracy. Quite to the contrary, they entail con­
solidation of the existing panoply of international environmental institutions 
and a shift toward a more modern “virtual” environmental regime. A multi­
stage approach is envisioned, building on the strengths of current institutions 
(and especially on UNEP as an anchor), addressing weaknesses, and creating 
innovative arrangements where necessary.108 Table 2 summarizes these recom­
mendations to the UN Secretary-General, to governments, and to UNEP. 
Table 2 Recommendations 
United Nations Secretary-General 
● Launch a comprehensive assessment of the global environmental governance 
system 
Governments 
● Create a global environmental 
information clearinghouse within 
UNEP 
● Create a global environmental 
capacity clearinghouse 
● Cluster institutions 
UNEP 
● Initiate an independent strategic 
review 
● Consolidate financial accounting 
and reporting 
● Restructure organizational gover­
nance 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
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and their Disposal 
CAR/RCU	 Convention for the Protection and Development 
of the Marine Environment in the Wider 
Caribbean Region (Cartagena Convention) 
CBD	 Convention on Biological Diversity 
CITES	 Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
CMS	 Convention on Migratory Species 
CPR	 Committee of Permanent Representatives 
CSD	 Commission on Sustainable Development 
DEWA	 Division of Early Warning and Assessment, UNEP 
EF	 Environment Fund 
EMG	 Environmental Management Group 
EPA 	 Environmental Protection Agency 
ESI	 Environmental Sustainability Index 
FAO	 Food and Agricultural Organization 
GC	 Governing Council 
GEF	 Global Environment Facility 
GEMS	 Global Environmental Monitoring System 
GEO	 Global Environmental Outlook 
GMEF	 Global Ministerial Environment Forum 
GPG	 Global Public Goods 
GRID	 Global Resource Information Database 
IAEA	 International Atomic Energy Agency 
ICAO	 International Civil Aviation Organization 
IFAD	 International Fund for Agricultural Development 
ILO	 International Labor Organization 
IMCO	 International Maritime Consultative Organization 
IMO	 International Maritime Organisation 
ITU	 International Telecommunication Union 
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JPO Junior Professional Officer 
MAP/RCU Mediterranean Action Plan – Barcelona 
Convention 
MEAs Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
NGO Nongovernmental Organizations 
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
Ramsar Ramsar Convention on Wetlands 
UN United Nations 
UNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 
UNCCD United Nations Convention to Combat 
Desertification 
UNCHS United Nations Centre for Human Settlements 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development 
UNDCP United Nations International Drug Control 
Programme 
UNDESA United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on 
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UNFPA United Nations Population Fund 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 
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Organization 
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UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
UPU Universal Postal Union 
WCMC World Conservation Monitoring Center 
WFP World Food Programme 
WHO World Health Organization 
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization 
WMO World Meteorological Organization 
WTO World Trade Organization 
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